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1. Introduction
Banking crises have become extremely frequent and widespread. Since 1980, over 1930 countries,
comprising almost three fourths of the International Monetary Fund’s member countries, have
undergone severe banking problems (Lingren et al., 1996). Most of all, banking crises have hit
emerging economies. In Argentina and Chile, for instance, damages were more than or equal to
25% of GDP (Goldstein & Turner, 1996). This paper explores banking crises when banks can hide
their loan losses by rolling over these loans. Although the model is most consistent with banking
crises in emerging economies, the results can be generalized to developed countries.
The assumption of banks’ ability to hide their loan losses is clearly supported by evidence.
Most of the evidence comes form the emerging economies with relatively weak auditing systems
and poor bank transparency. In Russia, for example, the true financial condition of banks is unclear
due to fallacious accounting data.1 The data is impaired by hidden loan losses. “Bad loan problems
were substantial although in many cases hidden by repeated rollovers of loans with capitalisation of
interest (OECD, 2001, p. 161).” Similar conclusions are drawn by Hansson & Tombak’s (1999,
p.217) regarding the Baltic economies.
The ability of banks to roll over problem loans concealed their true solvency and created a
false picture of health. Bank profits and thus net worth were overstated. When the hidden
problems finally emerged, especially through improved accounting and auditing, the resulting
erosion of profits and capital was unexpected.
Rojas-Suarez & Weisbrod (1996) and de Juan (1996, 2003) document abundant evidence from
Latin America. “In fact, several banking crises in Latin America have been preceded by
capitalization of unpaid interest into new loans to make non-performing loans look healthy (Rojas-
Suarez & Weisbrod, 1996, p.18).”
Banks generally hide their loan losses also in developed economies. In Japan, the total
volume of non-performing loans in all deposit-taking institutions amounted to ¥25 trillion in 1998
based on old accounting standards. Yet, the introduction of novel, more stringent, standards lifted
the burden of non-performing loans to ¥35 trillion (Levy, 1998). Diverse methods were exploited in
hiding. “By the 1990s, Japanese banks were reportedly restructuring nonviable loans by reducing
1 Tompson (2000, p. 616) brings forward an example on the poor accounting information of the Russian banks “The
results reported by Inkombank for 1998 show a healthy profit of $422 million on RAS (Russian accounting standard)
but a loss of $355 million on IAS (International accounting standard).” In reality, Inkombank was clearly insolvent.
interest  rates  and  extending  their  maturity.  Banks  also  often  recapitalized  unpaid  interest  and
opened new credit lines so that borrowers could repay overdue loans (Kanaya & Woo, 2001, p.14).”
For novel empirical evidence from U.S.A, see Gunther & Moore (2003).
To explore how the option to hide loan losses affects on the banks’ risk taking and banking
crises, this paper develops a dynamic model of financial intermediation. As in Holmström & Tirole
(1997), the task of the bank is to monitor its borrowers. Yet, deposit insurance and limited liability
tempt the bank to neglect costly monitoring. The main novelty in the analysis is that non-
monitoring strategy may be optimal to a bank although it cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans,
since the bank can hide its loan losses via loan rollovers. The loans seem to be performing and the
bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent.
When does ex ante moral hazard occur in the model? Moral hazard occurs when the costs of
monitoring borrowers are high for banks. Additionally, moral hazard occurs when a bank
regulator’s auditing system is weak and bank transparency is poor. In contrast to standard moral
hazard,  e.g.  Holmström  &  Tirole  (1997),  the  audits  are  not  targeted  to  evaluate  credit  risk  of
performing loans. Instead, the regulator audits banks in order to uncover hidden loan losses. By
eliminating the hiding, the regulator can eliminate moral hazard. If the regulator’s auditing system
is weak, the bank insolvency is uncovered only by dynamic illiquidity: bank’s loan interest income
is inadequate for payments on deposits. Illiquidity appears when the share of hidden loan losses on
the bank’s balance sheet is sufficiently large.
The model is also utilized to explore ex post moral hazard. How does a bank react when it
already possesses hidden loan losses? Maybe surprisingly, an optimizing bank may react in two
opposite ways.
1. A bank may grow aggressively in order to gamble for resurrection (see Kane, 1989). Rapid
growth pushes up the share of fresh, performing loans on the balance sheet, thereby
increasing the loan interest income and making it possible to avoid bankruptcy.
2. A bank may shrink the scale of its lending. Given an equity ratio requirement, it can lower
the amount of equity by shrinking lending. The “excess equity” can be paid out as a
dividend. The bank attempts to pay out as much dividends as possible before as its true
financial condition surfaces and it is closed down.
A bank prefers growth to shrinkage if the required equity ratio is small. Intuitively, growth calls for
an injection of fresh equity capital. The owners of the bank are unwilling to inject much equity into
an insolvent bank. Instead, when the required equity ratio is small, it is optimal to inject fresh equity
and gamble for resurrection. The model also discloses that an insolvent bank is ready to pay high
interest on deposits in order to fund the growth. The heavier the burden of non-performing loans in
the balance sheet, the more the bank favours growth and the more it is ready to pay for deposits.
This paper builds on rich analysis on moral hazard in banking: e.g. Diamond (1984),
Kane (1989), Holmström & Tirole (1997), Matutes & Vives (1996, 2000), Hellman & Murdock &
Stiglitz (2000), Niinimäki (2001, 2004) and Cordella & Yeyati (2003). Most of all, the paper relates
to the recent articles of Aghion & Bolton & Fries (1999) and Mitchell (2001) in which a bank can
hide its true solvency via loan rollovers. The articles shed light on optimal bailout policies.2
Instead, the purpose of this paper is to construct a simple model that can reproduce some of the
stylized facts reported above and thereby investigate the origin of financial crises in emerging
economics and the roles of banking sector and moral hazard in this context. Under investigation are
both ex ante and ex post moral hazard as well as how the length of lending relationships and
diversification influence on the magnitude of moral hazard. Some early warning signals on moral
hazard behaviour can be observed and a few regulatory recommendations can be given (see
Conclusion). For alternative explanations for financial crises in emerging economies see Corsetti &
Pesenti & Roubini (1999a, 1999b), Chang & Velasco (2000, 2001), Berglof & Roland (1997),
Goldstein (1997) and Goldstein & Turner (1996).
2  Aghion  et  al.  (1999)  find  that  a  tough  bank  recapitalization  policy  in  which  bank  managers  are  always  dismissed
drives the managers to hide bad loans by rolling them over. This softens the budget constraints of the banks’ borrowers.
A mild recapitalization policy creates incentives to overstate bad loans to obtain larger recapitalization. Mitchell (2001)
compares three bailout policies: a laissez-faire policy, transfer of bad debt to an asset management company, and
cancellation of debt inherited from a previous regime. The government’s choice of policy affects bank behaviour and
bank’s borrowers’ behaviour. None of the policies prove to be unconditionally optimal. The analysis is enriched in
Mitchell (2000). Cordella & Yeati (2003) show that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to bail out
insolvent banks in times of adverse macroeconomic shocks, can create risk-reducing “value effect” that outweighs the
moral hazard component of the bailout, and thus lowers bank risk.
2.  The model
The model has two periods, a fully competitive banking sector, depositors, firms with different
projects and a bank regulator. To begin with, different project types are introduced. Next, a firm’s
incentive to shirk effort during its project is presented. This incentive problem is shown to be
eliminated through bank monitoring. Thereafter, the analysis turns to the risks and returns of
banking and to a bank’s choice whether to monitor its borrowers or not.
2.1 Project types
A firm can undertake a project, which requires a unit of investment capital. The firm is owned and
run by an entrepreneur, who has no capital. The entrepreneur may deliberately restrict the project’s
probability of success by shirking effort in order to achieve a private, non-monetary benefit, b .
Different project types exist. In the absence of shirking, each project type always succeeds. Under
shirking, each project type is risky and succeeds with probability 10, << pp , in every period and
fails with probability p-1 . The realized project type is learned by a firm during period-1
subsequent to the investment and the decision whether or not to shirk effort.
A fast project lasts for a period. If successful, it produces Y units output after the period (at the
end of a period).
A slow project lasts for two periods. If successful, it produces R  units after period-1. If it also
succeeds during period-2, it then produces Y  units. When the project is liquidated after period-1,
the liquidation value is 0.
A very slow project takes for two periods. It produces no interim output after period-1. If
successful, it produces 2Y after period-2. A liquidation value of a very slow project is Y . Very slow
projects, which are really productive, occur only in the absence of shirking during period-1.
A failed project has no value and the failure is definite.
Although a firm has not shirked effort during period-1, it can start shirking during period-2.
Even if a slow project or a very slow project succeeds during period-1, it can fail during period-2, if
the entrepreneur then shirks effort.
2.2 Project values with and without monitoring
It is assumed that self-interested bankers own and run banks. Initially, bank size is 1 and it is funded
with equity capital, ,E 10 ££ E , and deposits, E-1 .  Deposit interest rate is r , which also
represents the cost of equity to the banker (=he). Banks finance firms’ projects. Given full
competition and the cost of bank monitoring, m , loan interest rate satisfies cmrR ++=  in both
periods, since slow and very slow projects need to be monitored during both periods. Here c
denotes the cost of lending per a loan unit.
When a bank grants a loan to a firm during period-1, the project type is still unknown
and the bank makes a one-period loan contract with a firm. The firm promises to repay R+1 ,
principal and loan interest, after period-1, but the contract includes two options to roll over the loan.
Rolling over 1 (for slow projects): If the firm pays loan interest, R , after period-1, the bank can roll
over the loan and delay the repayment of the principal until period-2. The firm then repays R+1 .
Rolling over 2 (for very slow projects): If a project proves to be very slow, the firm cannot repay
anything after period-1, and the loan is rolled over. The extent of a new loan is R+1  (unpaid
interest is capitalized) and the firm promises to repay 2)1( R+  after period-2.
More precisely, a firm recognizes the materialized type of its project during period-1. The type is
private information and observable only to the firm and its bank (even if the project output is
assumed to be publicly observable). The bank rolls over the loans that are granted for slow and very
slow projects. In this way, the interruption of productive long-term projects can be prevented.
The task of the banks is to grant loans to firms, monitor them and thereby eliminate
shirking. The following standard assumption is made.
Assumption 1. Without bank monitoring, firms shirk effort. Under shirking, each project type has
negative NPV (net present value) in every period, but in the absence of shirking the NPV is positive.
With bank monitoring, shirking is avoided and the projects have positive NPV.
Next, the content of Assumption 1 is detailed. The detailed assumptions are not essential to
understand the rest of the paper.
 i. It is assumed that without monitoring a firm shirks effort during period-1
[ ][ ] [ ]{ } ³+--++-+++-- bRYppbRRpsbRYps mmm )1()()1()1( d                          (2.1)
[ ] { } [ ]mmmm RYsvRYRRsvRYv ----+--+--++- 1)1)(1()1()1()1( 22 &&&&&&&&& dd .
Here )1(1 r+=d  is the discount factor. Loan interest rate is now crRm +=  , since lending without
monitoring is explored. The firm needs to decide whether or not to shirk effort before than the type
of the project materializes. The L.H.S expresses expected firm profits when it shirks effort, whereas
the R.H.S reveals the profits in the absence of shirking. On the L.H.S the first term represents firm
profits, when the project proves to be fast and the second term {in parenthesis} describes the profits
when a slow project materializes and the rollover option is used. The R.H.S consists of three terms.
With expected probability v&&& , the project proves to be very slow. With probability sv )1( &&&- , it is
slow and with probability )1)(1( sv -- &&&  a fast project materializes. Here s  is fixed.
ii. Even if monitoring eliminated shirking during period-1, the firm will shirk effort
during period-2 without monitoring
[ ] )1)(1()1)(1( 22 mm RRYbRRYp ++->+++- , [ ] )1()1( mm RYbRYp +->++- .              (2.2)
The first inequality implies that shirking is optimal during the second period of a very slow project.
The second inequality states that shirking is also optimal during the second period of a slow project.
Note that loan interest rate is R  during period-1 due to monitoring, but mR  during period-2.
iii. With monitoring, the NPVs of the projects are positive
)1(.)1.) 2 RYYiiRYi +>+> .                                           (2.3)
The first inequality says that fast projects and slow projects have positive NPV and the second
inequality, which follows from the first one, gives an equal result for very slow projects.
iv. Without monitoring, the projects have negative NPV due to shirking
crbpYi ++<+ 1. crbpRii +<+. )1(. 2 crYbpYiii ++<+ .                 (2.4)
The first and the second inequality state that fast and slow projects have negative NPV under
shirking. The third inequality gives an equal result for a very slow project (during period-2).
2.3 Bank’s balance sheet
A bank has a total measure 1 of borrowers (=firms). With monitoring, a stochastic fraction v  of
firms faces a very slow project. Here v  has a support [ ]vv, , 10 <<£ vv , continues density w ,
and distribution W . Regarding the rest of the projects, v-1 , a fixed fraction s  of these will be slow
and the rest s-1  will be fast. Hence, the volumes of financed projects are: v  very slow
projects, sv)1( -  slow projects and )1)(1( sv --  fast projects.
Without monitoring, a stochastic fraction l  of the projects fails and these firms default
their loans. Here l  has a support [ ]LL, , 10 <<< LL , continues density f , and distribution F .
The realized share of loan losses is at the lower limit, L , for example, when the economy is
booming, and at the upper limit, L  , under a severe depression. Regarding the rest of the projects,
l-1 , a fixed fraction s  of those will be slow and the rest s-1  will be fast. Thus, the volumes of
financed projects are: l  failed projects, sl)1( -  slow projects and )1)(1( sl --  fast projects.
To clarify connections between symbols, it is useful to note that firm’s expected
probability to success under shirking meets
ò -=
L
L
dllflp )()1( .                  (2.5)
Since an average project is unprofitable under shirking, loans are on average also unprofitable
crdllfRl
L
L
++<+-ò 1)()1)(1( .                 (2.6)
It is now possible to shed light on the roles of different projects. To begin with, recall that very slow
projects as well as the projects that fail during period-1 yield no output after period-1. Additionally,
the fractions of both project types are stochastic. Furthermore, the loans, which are granted for these
projects, can be rolled over. Since the project types are unobservable to outsiders, they cannot know
whether a bank rolls over a loan in order to delay the repayment of a very slow project (which is
socially valuable) or to hide a default of a loan repayment (which is socially harmful). The role of
the slow projects is to show how the illiquidity of these projects offers an effective incentive
mechanism. The existence of fast projects makes it possible to investigate the effects of growth and
shrinkage. All of this will be detailed below.
The bank regulator (= she) insures deposits and supervises banks. She pre-commits to
close down a bank that neglects monitoring. The closed bank is liquidated and the liquidation
proceeds are first and foremost spent for lending costs and thereafter for deposit payments. The
remainder of the proceeds, if any, is paid to the banker.
Thereafter the analysis will turn to the problem of moral hazard between a bank and
the regulator. The bank attempts to neglect costly monitoring and the regulator aims to eliminate
this. To investigate how the existence of long-term lending relationships and the option to hide loan
losses affect on the magnitude of moral hazard, two bank types are introduced. Bank A finances
only fast projects via short-term loans. Bank B finances all project types and also has long-term
lending relationships with rolled over loans. The time line is the following.
1.1 The regulator imposes an equity capital requirement, E , to banks for both periods.
1.2 Each bank maintains E  and attracts the amount E-1  of deposits.
1.3 Banks grant loans and decide whether to monitor or not. The choice to neglect monitoring is
irreversible. If a bank neglects monitoring during period-1, it also neglects monitoring during
period-2. Yet, a bank can switch to the non-monitoring strategy during period-2, even if it
monitored during period-1. Without monitoring, firms shirk effort.
1.4 The firms recognize their project types. Under shirking, some projects fail.
1.5 The end of period-1: fast projects mature and these loans are repaid. Slow projects yield
interim loan interest R . These loans as well as the loans for very slow projects are rolled over.
If a bank has neglected monitoring, it rolls over defaulted loans.
1.6 The regulator audits banks. If a bank has loan losses, it manages to hide them from the
regulator with probability h . With probability h-1 , the regulator uncovers the loan losses
and closes down the bank. Here 1<h  for two reasons; either the regulator does not audit
every bank or the quality of the audits is so weak that the regulator cannot uncover every
hiding attempt. Even when the regulator cannot uncover a hiding attempt, loan losses surface,
if their realized share is so large that the bank is illiquid. The bank is then closed down.
2.1    If the bank is not closed, it can pay the costs of lending, interest on deposits and dividends.
         Simultaneously, the bank attracts fresh deposits for period-2.
2.2    During period-2, the loan rollovers occupy a large share of the loan portfolio. Yet, since
some projects were fast and matured during period-1, the loan portfolio has room for fresh
loans. These loans are granted for fast projects with maturity after period-2.
2.3    At the end of period-2, all outstanding loans mature and the bank is closed down. It pays back
   deposits and the banker receives the remaining returns.
3. Bank A: short-term lending
This section explores moral hazard and evaluates an incentive compatible amount of bank equity,
when a bank finances fast projects via short-term loans. This means that both the fractions of slow
projects and very slow projects are zero.
Assumption 2. .0)1()1)(1(. >-+-+- crRLi
.0)1)(1(. >-+- cRLii
Assumption 2i generates the problem of moral hazard under short-term lending. Banking may be
profitable without monitoring. According to Assumption 2ii, a bank that is fully equity funded can
always pay the cost of lending, c . This simplifies the analysis since a bank that is fully equity
funded never collapses.
Under full competition, banker’s earnings are zero if he monitors. If the non-
monitoring strategy yields positive expected earnings, the banker will neglect monitoring. Without
monitoring, the banker’s expected earnings are
.)1)(1()1)(1(
,)1()()1()1()1)(1(
cErRlwhere
ErdllfcErRl
Short
l
L
Short
+-+=+-
+---+-+-ò (3.1)
Since projects are fast, the bank can be liquidated after both periods. Here Shortl  marks the highest
realized share of loan losses so that the bank can pay back deposits. The banker’s earnings consist
of expected bank returns (the first, positive term) and the costs of injected equity, Er)1( + .  As
regards to the bank returns, when a share l  of loans defaults, loan repayments (principal and
interest) amount to )1)(1( Rl +- , and payments to depositors are )1)(1( rE +- . If the realized share
of loan losses exceeds Shortl , the bank collapses and the banker receives no returns. Appendix A
asserts the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. When a bank finances only fast projects, it neglects monitoring without equity
capital. There is an incentive compatible amount of equity, *ShortE , which eliminates moral hazard.
Since banks are identical in both periods, *ShortE  represents the incentive compatible amount of
equity in both periods. Intuitively, in the absence of equity the costs of bank formation are zero. If
the banker neglects monitoring, the share of loan losses is small with positive probability, the bank
makes a profit and the banker’s earnings are positive. If the realized share of loan losses is large, the
bank collapses. The banker earns nothing, but he bears no costs either. Thus, the expected earnings
from the non-monitoring strategy are positive. To eliminate this, a positive amount of equity capital
must be required. The requirement forces bankers to have some of their own capital at risk so that
they internalize the inefficiency of non-monitoring.
4. Bank B: long-term lending with monitoring
To study moral hazard under long-term lending, the original assumptions are restored. With
monitoring, a stochastic fraction v  of projects is very slow. Regarding the rest of the projects, v-1 ,
a fixed fraction, s , of these is slow, while the rest of the loans are fast.
After period-1, a monitoring bank rolls over v  loans for very slow projects and
sv)1( -  loans for slow projects. The latter loans yield loan interest sRv)1( - . The )1)(1( sv --
loans for fast projects mature yielding )1)(1)(1( Rsv +-- . The bank pays back deposits, r+1 , and
attracts at the same time fresh deposits, 1,  for period-2. In this way, the interruption of long-term
loans (and long-term projects) can be avoided. The banker’s earnings during period-1 are
)1()()1()1(
1
rEmdvvwcrERv
v
v
+------ò ,                   (4.1)
where 1v  denotes the maximum fraction of rolled over loans; 0)1()1( 1 =---- crERv .
 3
Recall that m  marks the non-monetary cost of monitoring. If vˆ  denotes the realized fraction of
rolled over loans, the earnings amount to EmcrRv ----- )ˆ1(   or ERv -- ˆ .  Here Rvˆ  represents
bank’s receivables from the rolled over loans for very slow projects. The receivables belong to the
returns from period-1 even if they are paid after period-2.  Because the receivables are not paid out
3 It is possible that the realized share of very slow borrowers, vˆ , is so high that the bank collapses if it rolls over all of
these loans since crERv +-<- )1()ˆ1( . In this case, it is assumed that the bank rolls over only 1v  loans so that
crERv +-=- )1()1( 1 . Then, some very slow projects must be interrupted after period-1 (the liquidation value is
Y ). The interruption is uneconomical. Later the bank is allowed to grow and the interruption is avoided.
from the bank after period-1, they increase the retained earnings of the bank and thus raise its equity
capital. For the same reason, the need of deposits for period-2 is RvE ˆ1 -- .
After period-2, all outstanding loans mature. The loans of very slow projects yield
2)1( Rv +  and loans of slow projects yield )1()1( Rsv +- . The rest of the funds were invested in
fresh fast projects at the beginning of period-2. These loans yield [ ] )1()1()1(1 RsvRv +--+- .
After payments on deposits, )1)(1( rvRE +--  , the banker’s earnings during period-2 amount to
[ ] )2.4(.)()1)(1()1()1()1(1)1()1()1(
1
2 mdvvwcrvRERsvRvRsvRv
v
v
--+---+--+-++-++ò
Given vv ˆ= , this simplifies to )1()1(ˆ rErRv +++ . The earnings are positive during period-2, but
equal to the present value of the losses from period-1. Thus, the life-time earnings from the
monitoring strategy are zero.
5. Long-term lending without monitoring
This section investigates moral hazard under long-term lending when the regulator’s auditing
system is imperfect and a bank can sometimes hide its loan losses, 0>h . 4 Without monitoring, a
stochastic fraction l  of the financed projects fails. The rest of the projects are either slow, sl)1( - ,
or fast, )1)(1( sl -- .  To keep the model simple, a few assumptions have to be made. Most of these
can be relaxed, but it makes the model more confused.
Assumption 3. .1. <=<£ vLLvi
.0)1()1(1. >--+- sLLRii
.)1(. cRLiii <-
cRsLiv <+-- )1)(1)(1(. .
[ ] hccrRLLRLRv +<++-++- )1()1()1()1(1. .
Assumption 3i ensures that the share of loan rollovers does not reveal that the loans are non-
performing. Instead, the regulator may incorrectly interpret these loans as performing and granted
for very slow projects. Assumption 3ii guarantees that the bank’s balance sheet has enough room
for loan rollovers, since their volume is assumed to be less than 1. Owing to Assumption 3iii,
bank’s loan interest income is inadequate to pay interest on deposits, when the share of realized
loan losses peaks, L . This makes it is possible to explore how dynamic illiquidity uncovers an
attempt at hiding. According to Assumption 3iv, loans on average are illiquid to the extent that a
non-monitoring bank collapses if it is liquidated after period-1. The assumption is supported by
evidence, since liquidation of a problem bank rarely yields anything to bank owners. Assumption 3v
highlights how loan losses accumulate in the long run, finally making a bank insolvent after period-
2.5  Here hc  denotes an extra cost of hiding during period-2. The bank needs to manipulate its
accounting and information on borrowers, the borrowers with failed projects do not purchase bank’s
services during period-2, etc.
4 In practise, banks roll over defaulted loans with great success. In Estonia, for example, a bank repeatedly rolled over a
substantial part of its loans. Some of the rolled over loans had been granted to firms which had already been declared
bankrupt (Branco et al., 1996).
5 The following values, for example, meet Assumptions 2 and 3: ,22.0,3.0,3.0,05.0 ==== cRLL
.1,85.0,01.0,07.0 ==== hcsrm
5.1 Stages of hiding
Suppose that a bank neglects monitoring during period-1 and a stochastic fraction 1ˆl  of loans default
(subscript 1 stresses that the realized loan losses stem from period-1). If these loans are not rolled
over, loan losses surface, the regulator closes down the bank and liquidates it. The banker earns the
remainder of the liquidation proceeds
{ } 0)1)(1()1)(1)(ˆ1(,0 =--+-+-- cErRslMax .                                                          (5.1)
Given the large fraction of slow projects (s) and the low liquidation value of these loans (0), it is
known that { } 0.. =Max  (Assumption 3iv). To avoid this, the bank always attempts to hide loan
losses via loan rollovers. Next the banker’s expected earnings under the option of hiding are
resolved. Four cases arise depending on whether or not the bank manages in the attempt to hide.
With probability h )( 1lF  the bank manages in hiding option and makes during
period-1 expected returns
1111 )()1()1(
1
dllfcrERl
l
L
----= òp . (5.2)
Here Rl )1( 1-  marks the total loan interest income from successful fast loans, Rsl )1)(1( 1 -- ,  and
successful slow loans, sRl )1( 1- . A share 1l  of loans is defaulted and rolled over. The outsiders do
not know whether the loans are rolled over in order to finance very slow projects or to hide loan
losses. The second term rE)1( -  indicates interest payments on deposits. Only if the loan interest
income is adequate to pay interest on deposits, hiding is possible. Thus, the realized share of loan
losses, 1ˆl , has an upper limit, 1l  , so that the bank can only pay just interest on deposits
0)1()1( 1 =---- crERl . (5.3)
The probability that the realized share of loan losses is low enough, 11ˆ ll £ , is )( 1lF .
With probability [ ])(1 1lFh -  the regulator’s audit does not uncover loan losses, but
their realized share exceeds 1l . Dynamic illiquidity – loan interest income, Rl )ˆ1( 1- , is insufficient
for the interest on deposits, rE)1( - - now uncovers loan losses and the bank is closed down. The
banker receives the remainder of the liquidation proceeds, 0, just as in (5.1).
With probability h-1 , the regulator can uncover loan losses and closes the bank. The
banker again receives the remainder of the liquidation proceeds, 0, just as in (5.1).
With probability )( 1lFh the bank manages to hide during period-1 and achieves
period-2. After period-2 all outstanding loans mature. The bank’s expected returns from period-2
are (the ex ante point of view, when the share of period-1 loan losses has not been realized)
[ ] )4.5(.0)()()1)(1()1)(1()1(1 2211121
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Again, tl  denotes the highest share of realized loan losses during period-t, { }2,1Ît , so that a bank
can pay back deposits. The result, no earnings, follows from the assumption 3v. The inherited non-
performing loans from period-1 occupy a large share of the balance sheet, 1ˆ)1( lR+ . The burden of
non-performing loans accumulates, since unpaid interest is capitalized; the size of these loans
expands from 1 unit to R+1  units. Given the hidden loan losses and loan rollovers for performing
slow projects there is relatively little room for fresh loans. Since 02 >³ Ll , a part of the loans
again default during period-2. The accumulated non-performing loans erode loan repayments,
which is insufficient to cover the costs of banking after period-2 and the bank collapses.
The banker’s total earnings from the non-monitoring strategy consist of expected bank
returns (5.2) from which the costs of injected bank equity are subtracted
Erh )1(1 +-=P p .                                           (5.5)
Some noteworthy discoveries can be made. To start with, when a realized share of loan losses is
low,
h
ll 11ˆ < , and when a hiding attempt is successful, the bank makes a profit, -- Rl )ˆ1( 1
0)1( >-- crE . In reality, the bank may be insolvent <+- )1)(ˆ1( 1 Rl crE ++- )1)(1(  and its true
equity ratio is negative. Thus, the information value of the official equity ratio, E , is modest when
the bank has been operating for some time and possesses non-performing loans. The insolvency is
uncovered only after period-2 , when the bank collapses (recall (5.4)). To explain the bank collapse,
an outsider may argue that the bank neglected monitoring during period-2 and that a devastating
shock – for example, a macroeconomic downturn or financial panic - then hit the banking sector ( 2ˆl
is really high). The explanation is deficient, since the bank has been insolvent for a long time, but it
has been able to hide its true financial condition. The shock of period-2 may have a minor effect on
the volume of loan losses and any explanation, which stresses the economic factors of period-2 as
the actual origin of the bank collapse, is deficient.
If the auditing system is really weak, 1=h , insolvency is uncovered after period-1
only if a bank is illiquid, crERl +-<- )1()ˆ1( 1 . Hence, illiquidity provides an important signal of
bank insolvency.6
Owing to the option to hide loan losses, the costs of bank restructuring are likely to
skyrocket. To see this, suppose that lll == 21 . Without hiding, )1( Rl +  represents the volume of
loan losses. With hiding, the volume of hidden loan losses is )1( Rl +  after period-1. The bank
reinvests the rest of the funds, )1(1 Rl +- , and a fraction l  of loans again default during period-2.
The loan losses from period-2 account for [ ] lRRl )1()1(1 ++- . The total value of loan losses after
period-2 is
[ ] )1()1)(1(1)1( RlRlRl +>+-++ .                    (5.6)
For example, if 1.0=l  and 3.0=R , the volume of loan losses accounts for =+ )1( Rl
13.03.1*1.0 =   without hiding. Using (5.6) it is easy to see that the volume of loan losses is more
than doubled, 28.0 , with hiding. Two causes for the doubling up of volume exist. First, the loan
losses of period-1 are multiplied by R+1 , since unpaid loan interest is capitalized in the size of the
loan. Second, during period-1, some loans default. The bank keeps on gambling with the rest of the
funds and some of these loans default again during period-2. Hence, the volume of loan losses
accumulates period after period and achieves a larger total volume than what can be achieved
6 The crucial role of illiquidity as a signal of bank insolvency is documented by De Juan (1996). “When the Spanish
banking crisis on the late 1970s and early 1980s began, …, insolvent banks were identified only when they became
illiquid (De Juan, 1996, p. 100).” “In the mid 1980s, Argentina suffered a very serious banking crisis that affected
mostly new banks and banks run by new bankers. Some two to three hundred banks experienced interventions and/or
were liquidated. Practically all were insolvent, but intervention was triggered by illiquidity. Only through illiquidity was
the insolvency discovered (De Juan, 1996, p. 93).”
during a single period. The doubled volume may help to explain why the share of non-performing
loans has been extremely large in numerous emerging economies and why the costs of bank
restructuring have been so massive.7
When the auditing system is complete, 0=h , the banker’s expected earnings amount
Er)1( +-=P . The non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable even without bank equity.
Proposition 2. When h=0, the problem of moral hazard disappears under long-term lending. Moral
hazard is a lesser problem under long-term lending than under short-term lending.
For the latter part of the Proposition 2, recall Proposition 1. Intuitively, the fact that a significant
part of loans are long-term and illiquid together with the fact that the loans mature and are repaid at
different times creates an effective incentive mechanism. Since the auditing system is perfect, loan
losses are uncovered at the maturity of short-term loans (after period-1), the bank is closed down
and liquidated. The loans, which are granted for slow projects, are still ongoing.  The fraction of
these loans, s , is large and the loans have a minimal liquidation value, 0. Thus, the liquidation
value of the whole bank is negative even when the realized share of loan losses is at the lower
limit.8 The bank liquidation yields no earnings to the banker and the incentive problem is
eliminated.9
7 In many emerging economies, the share of non-performing loans has proved to be tragic: 80-90% in Kyrgyz Republic,
75% in Bulgaria, 75% in Congo, 60-70% in Cameroon, 40% in Ghana, etc. In developed countries with banking crises,
the shares of non-performing loans have been much lower: 13% in Finland, 6% in Norway, etc. (Lindgren et al., 1996).
8 Alternatively, loans may mature at the same time if information on loan losses surfaces in the middle of the loan
period. Suppose that at time 0 a bank grants loans for illiquid projects, which mature at time 2. At time 1 signals
become public. A signal indicates whether or not a project will succeed. If the signals reveal that some projects will fail,
the regulator closes down the bank. Given the illiquidity of projects, the liquidation proceeds are so minimal that the
banker receives no earnings.
9 Without deposit insurance, a panic of unprotected depositors has the same incentive effect. Suppose that depositors
can observe after period-1 that their bank has suffered loan losses and that this information triggers a bank run. Given a
low liquidation value of slow projects, the bank collapses. This is enough to eliminate moral hazard. For financial
panics, see also Diamond & Dybvig (1983), Chang & Velasco (2000, 2001) and Niinimäki (2003).
5.2 Incentive compatible bank equity
The following result is achieved in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. When a bank finances long-term projects and can hide its loan losses, the bank
neglects monitoring in the absence of equity capital. There is an incentive compatible amount of
equity, 0* >LongE , which makes the non-monitoring strategy unprofitable.
The option to hide loan losses worsens moral hazard. In contrast to Proposition 2, long-term loans
without hiding, the incentive compatible amount of equity is now positive. The regulator should
recognize the characteristics of the local economy when she sets equity requirements (Appendix C).
Proposition 4. The weaker the auditing system (the higher h), the bigger the incentive compatible
amount of equity, *LongE , is.
Equity capital and auditing system represent substitutes. In developed economies, where the
auditing systems are strong ( h  is low), the equity requirement can be small. In contrary, in
emerging economies with weak auditing systems more equity capital is needed; it is unlikely that
the regulator can uncover hidden loan losses ( h  is high) and moral hazard can be eliminated only
by requiring more equity.10 For the following result, see Appendix D.
Proposition 5. The higher the cost of monitoring for the bank, m  , the bigger the incentive
compatible amount of equity, *LongE ,  is.
The higher the cost of monitoring, the more profitable the non-monitoring strategy is. Monitoring
costs are high in many emerging economies due to the lack of information on the creditworthiness
of firms and insufficient creditor rights. Imperfect property titles as well as poor mortgage and
10 There is strong empirical evidence that bank exams have an important role in uncovering financial problems (see
Dahl & O’keefe & Hanweek, 1998, and Gunther & Moore, 2003).
commitment registers also raise the costs of monitoring.11 Consequently, more equity capital ought
to be required in these economies.
5.3 Omit earned interest receivables from equity
In Section 4, a bank monitored its borrowers. Since very slow projects yielded no output during
period-1, these loans created interest receivables, vR , thereby raising the amount of bank equity.
Thus, rolled over loans and interest receivables had a positive effect on the bank’s incentives.
Suppose that the required amount of equity is *LongE . A bank monitors and rolls over
)1(ˆ Rv +  loans for very slow projects after period-1. The loans create interest receivables Rvˆ . If the
receivables are incorporated in equity, the bank equity amounts to RvELong ˆ
* + . To extract excessive
equity and to restore the requirement *LongE , the bank can pay out some initially injected equity,
[ ]RvEMin Long ˆ,* , as dividend.
Unfortunately, this alternative worsens moral hazard, since the regulator is unable to
observe the type of the rolled over loans and the real worth of interest receivables. Suppose that the
bank neglects monitoring during period-1 and rolls over )1(1ˆ Rl +  non-performing loans having
interest receivables Rl1ˆ , which can be incorporated in equity. The equity capital amounts to
RlELong 1
* ˆ+ . To restore the required amount of equity, the bank can pay out, [ ]RlEMin Long 1* ˆ, , as a
dividend.  Only after period-2, the truth is uncovered; the rolled over loans proved to be non-
performing and interest receivables are worthless.
This increases earnings from period-1 by [ ]RlEMin Long 1* ˆ,  . During period-2, the bank
needs more deposits, [ ]RlEMin Long 1* ˆ, , to compensate for the reduction of equity. This is, however,
meaningless for the bank, since it will collapse in any case after period-2. Thus, the alternative to
incorporate interest receivables into equity capital and pay out initially injected equity increases the
returns of the non-monitoring strategy, making it optimal under the equity requirement *LongE .
12
11 Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) find empirical evidence that countries with weak legislation and enforcement
have frequent banking crises.
12 The result is supported by the report of de Juan (1993, p. 24):”… lead bankers to provision less than they should, but
will also lead them to capitalize interest, that is, to account for refinanced interest (which in fact will be increased
losses) as income. So, looking back to the income statement, the bankers have achieved better profits not only because
Corollary 1. The regulator should exclude earned interest receivables from bank equity.
5.4 Equity requirement
Section 5 resolved the incentive compatible equity ratio, which eliminates moral hazard under long-
term lending, *LongE . Section 4 derived the incentive compatible equity ratio, which eliminates moral
hazard under short-term lending, *ShortE . The regulator imposes equity requirement
=*E { }** , LongShort EEMax .                     (5.7)
This requirement eliminates the moral hazard incentives of both bank types (Bank A, Bank B)
during both periods.
provisions are lower, but even more important, because interest accruals are artificial, thanks to procedures that make
loans look like evergreens”.
6. Diversification
Can the regulator eliminate moral hazard by forcing banks to diversify their lending? In his
influential article, Diamond (1984) demonstrates how perfect diversification within a financial
intermediary eliminates moral hazard. Utilizing the weak law of large numbers as well as an
assumption on independent and identically distributed project returns, he points out that the moral
hazard problem disappears as the number of financed projects multiplies without bound. In the
current model, the Diamond’s insight results in the observation that without monitoring a fixed
fraction of loans always default,
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Suppose that a bank finances only fast projects (Bank A). Again, perfect diversification eliminates
moral hazard and no equity capital is needed, since
ò <-+-+-=-+-+
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Suppose now that a bank finances also slow and very slow projects (Bank B) and can hide its loan
losses ( 1=h ). Under perfect diversification and without equity capital, the bank’s returns during
period-1 are crpR --  or
[ ] )1()1()1( pcrRp -+-+-+ .                       (6.2)
Given (6.1), the term in brackets is negative, whereas the second term is positive. The moral hazard
behaviour is more profitable under long-term lending than under short-term lending. Two cases
occur. If (6.2) is negative, diversification eliminates moral hazard also under long-term lending. The
realized share of loan losses is so large that the loan interest income does not cover interest on
deposits, the bank cannot hide its loan losses and collapses. If (6.2) is positive, even perfect
diversification does not eliminate moral hazard, but some equity capital is needed.
The positive incentive effect of diversification is based on the principle that loan
losses are subtracted from loan repayments and bank equity. The subtracted volume is so large
under perfect diversification that moral hazard is unprofitable. This effect vanishes when hiding is
possible. Since no loan losses officially exist, nothing is subtracted. The extra benefit is represented
by p-1  in (6.2).
Diversification may be imperfect. Suppose that the regulator can force banks to
diversify their lending so that the lower limit of loan losses, L  , is extended to such a level that
-+- )1)(1( RL 0)1( <-+ cr . (6.3)
Now imperfect diversification eliminates moral hazard under short-term lending (Bank A). How
about Bank B that finances also long-term projects? Imperfect diversification eliminates moral
hazard if 0)1( <--- crRL , or
[ ] LcrRL +-+-+- )1()1)(1( ,                                                                                                 (6.4)
is negative. Again, even if (6.3) is negative, (6.4) can be positive or negative. Hence, it is possible
that imperfect diversification eliminates moral hazard.
Proposition 6. When loans are perfectly diversified, moral hazard is eliminated if the bank finances
only fast projects. If the bank also finances long-term projects and can hide its loan losses,
diversification may eliminate moral hazard. Under some parameter values, moral hazard remains.
Hence, if 0>h  it is possible that the problem of moral hazard is more severe when the bank
finances long-term projects than when it finances only short-term projects. This result contradicts
Proposition 2: when 0=h  and without diversification, the problem of moral hazard is more severe
when the bank finances short-term projects via short-term loans.  Consequently, diversification and
the quality of the bank supervision, h , together determine whether the moral hazard problem is
more severe under long-term lending or under short-term lending.13
13 Recall the values of footnote 5 and suppose that a bank operates in the absence of equity. Under the original support,
[ ] [ ]3.0,05.0, =LL  both alternatives are profitable without monitoring. At the lower limit, 05.0=L , short-term
lending yields 0.005 and long-term lending yields 0.055 (when 0=h ). Suppose now that the regulator can force banks
to diversify their lending so that a new support is [ ]25.0,1.0 . Now short-term lending is unprofitable at the new lower
limit (-0.06), but long-term lending is still profitable (0.04).
7. Gambling for resurrection
At the beginning of period-2, the banker faces a difficult choice. He knows that the bank possesses
a burden of non-performing loans and that it will subsequently collapse at the end of the period.
This section explores how the bank optimally reacts to non-performing loans during period-2. Thus,
the analysis of the previous sections is extended. Alternatively, the section can be interpreted as a
separate research project. When the bank possesses, for whatever reason, non-performing loans in
its loan portfolio what is the bank’s optimal reaction?
As before, bank size is 1 during period-1, but now the bank is allowed to change the
scale of its lending during period-2. Subsection 7.1 examines the optimality of shrinkage, whereas
gambling for resurrection through growth is explored in subsection 7.2. Interestingly, both
alternatives may be profitable.
7.1  Shrink
Suppose that a bank neglected monitoring during period-1 and manages in the attempt to hide. The
bank size during period-2 is 2S  , [ ]1,02 ÎS . The required equity ratio, E , can be smaller than the
incentive compatible ratio, *E .14 Given the equity requirement, a shrinking bank can pay out excess
equity ES )1( 2-  as dividend in step 2.1 of the timeline. Instead, if the bank grows, the banker needs
to inject ES )1( 2 -  more equity in step 2.1.
What is the minimum of 2S ? The share of non-performing loans, )1(1ˆ Rl + , sets an
absolute bottom limit, since these loans must be rolled over. Further, the bank needs to roll over the
loans granted for slow projects, since the loans have an extremely low liquidation value, 0 . The
third loan type, fast loans, offers a tool to shrink lending. These loans mature after period-1 and the
14 Since the equity requirement may be under the incentive compatible level, it is implicitly assumed, that the regulator
may underestimate the need of equity. This assumption is chosen for several reasons. First, the incentive compatible
amount of equity is dependent on the costs of monitoring, m , and on the quality of the auditing system, h . If the
regulator, for example, undervalues the cost of monitoring in a local economy inadvertently, she will require banks to
maintain inadequate equity capital. Given the frequency and costs of recent banking crises, it is obvious that regulators
make this kind of mistake. Second, the regulator may be unwilling to raise the equity requirement over the normal level,
since this would indicate that the regulator is a bad auditor (Proposition 4). Third and most importantly, it is interesting
to investigate how banks operate when the equity requirement is too small. Are the results consistent with evidence?  If
so, this offers a noteworthy signal that the equity requirement should be raised.
bank could reinvest the funds in fresh short-term loans. Alternatively, the bank can skip the
reinvestment and shrink lending. As a result, the bank’s real minimum size during period-2 is
++= )1(1ˆ2 RlS 1)ˆ1( <- sl .                  (7.1)
Recall from (5.4) that without growth and shrinkage, the bank will collapse after period-2
[ ] ,)1)(ˆ1()ˆ1)(1(ˆ)1(1 121 hccrRlElRlR +++--<-++-                                              (7.2)
with every 21 ˆ,ˆ ll , and the banker earns nothing. In contrast, if the bank shrinks lending and pays out
excess equity, the banker earns )1()1( 2 rES +- . Since the earnings are increasing in E  and
decreasing in 2S , the bank shrinks its scale to 2S  and pays out ES )1( 2-  to the banker. Thus, the
bank always prefers shrinkage to the initial bank size, 1.
Proposition 7. A bank can always increase the banker’s earnings by shrinking lending during
period-2 and paying back initially injected equity capital. The earnings from shrinkage are
increasing in the required equity ratio and the scale of shrinkage.
Under the burden of hidden loan losses, the true financial condition of the bank is bad and it will
collapse after the period. Through shrinkage the banker can withdraw equity capital from the bank
before than its true financial condition surfaces and the bank is closed down. The shrinked quasi-
bank then keeps operating during period-2. After the period the truth surfaces; the loans proved to
be mostly rolled over non-performing loans and the bank is almost worthless.
Consider, for example, that the bank size is 1000 million euros and that the required
equity ratio is 8%. If the bank shrinks lending by 40%, it can pay out 32 million euros as extra
dividend.
Consequently, shrinkage increases the expected returns of the non-monitoring strategy
and equity ratio *E  may be too small to eliminate non-monitoring. Hence, the regulator ought to be
alerted when the bank attempts to shrink its lending and pay back initially injected equity.
7.2  Grow
This section analyzes the optimality of growth. The bank can grow during period-2 by granting
short-term loans for fast projects, which mature at the end of period-2. The maximum size during
period-2 satisfies, 221 SS ££ , where ¥<< 21 S . The expected bank returns during period-2 are
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where the upper limit of period-2 loan losses, );,ˆ( 212 SEll , satisfies
[ ] [ ] .)1(ˆ)1()1)(1(ˆ)1( 212212 hccSrRlESlRlRS +++--=-++-                   (7.4)
Three lemmas are derived.
Lemma 1. );,ˆ( 212 SEll  is decreasing in 1ˆl , but increasing in 2S .
Proof: Now (7.4) provides
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since 0)1)(1()1)(1( 2 >-+---+ crElR  and 0)1/()1()1)(1( 2 >++--+ RrRlR  (Appendix E).
First, the larger the burden of non-performing loans from period-1, smaller the share of loan losses
must be during period-2 so that the bank is still capable of paying back deposits. Second, the larger
2S  , the more rapidly the bank grows and the more it has fresh performing loans.  The relative
burden of the non-performing loans from period-1 is then small. Thus, the larger 2S , the higher the
share of loan losses can be during period-2 so that the bank is still capable of paying back deposits.
QED
Lemma 2. );,ˆ( 212 SEll  would approach );,0( 22 SEl if 2S could grow without bound. Since 2S is
assumed to be finite, it is known that <);,ˆ( 212 SEll );,0( 22 SEl  with every 2S .
Proof: Now (7.4) can be expressed as
[ ] )6.7(.)1/()1()1)(1()1(ˆ)1)(1()1)(1(
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First, recall Lemma 1. Then note that in (7.6) both sides are positive and diminishing in 2l . The
term on the R.H.S is the relative burden of period-1 loan losses. If 2S  could grow without bound,
the burden (the R.H.S) would decline to zero with every 1ˆl . Thus, 1ˆl  would be meaningless and
);,ˆ( 212 SEll  would raise to );,0( 22 SEl . The bank would operate as if it had no inherited loan losses,
and (7.6) would simplify to [ ] --+ );,0(1)1( 22 SElR 0)1)(1( =-+- crE  (Notice that
);,0( 22 SEl is identical to Shortl in (3.1) ). Yet, since 2S  is assumed to be finite, the burden of
inherited loan losses does not fully vanish and <);,ˆ( 212 SEll );,0( 22 SEl . QED
Lemma 3. When *ShortEE = , growth is unprofitable, but when
*
ShortEE <  growth is profitable if the
maximum achievable size, 2S  , is large enough. When *ShortEE < , the earnings from growth would
approach infinity if 2S  could grow without bound.
Lemma 3 is proved in Appendix F. It is enough to detail the optimality of growth when
*
ShortEE < .
15 To start with, (7.2) is rewritten as
[ ] )7.7(.)1/()1()1)(1()1()1)(1()1)(1(
2S
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when 12 =S . That is, the bank will be insolvent after period-2 if it retains its initial size, 1, even
when the share of loan losses is at the lower limit, L , during period-2. This means that
15 Since the bank gambles for resurrection by granting short-term loans, the incentive compatible level of short-term
lending is crucial.
LSEll =);,ˆ( 212   in (7.3) and thus bank returns are zero, 02 =p . Suppose now that the bank grows
by granting more one-period loans for fast projects during period-2. Since these fresh loans are
performing, growth raises the share of performing loans in the loan portfolio and increases the loan
interest income. There exist such a minimum bank size, 12 >
MinS , that the bank has a possibility to
break even during period-2
[ ] )8.7(.)1/()1()1)(1()1()1)(1()1)(1(
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An even more rapid growth pushes up the share of performing loans further so that the L.H.S
exceeds the R.H.S. Then, LSEll >);,ˆ( 212  in (7.3) and thus 02 >p ; expected bank returns are
positive. Hence, growth increases bank returns with certainty. This does not, however, ensure that
growth is profitable for the banker, who must inject fresh equity in the bank in order to maintain the
required equity ratio, E . The costs of fresh equity are )1()1( 2 rES +- .
If MinSS 22 < , growth is unprofitable, since the maximal achievable size, 2S , is so
small that the bank cannot grow out of its problems. Even if the bank expanded the maximal size,
2S , it could not obtain enough performing loans and the bank would collapse. Growth would only
incur costs, )1()1( 2 rES +- , to the banker. Thus, shrinkage is more profitable than growth.
When 2S MinS2> , growth is optimal when 2S  is large enough. If -< );,ˆ(0 212 SElp
<+- )1()1( 2 rES )1()1( 2 rES +- , growth is profitable, but still less profitable than shrinkage.
Only if 2S  is so large that );,ˆ( 212 SElp >+-- )1()1( 2 rES )1()1( 2 rES +-  growth is more
profitable than shrinkage. This is possible, given Lemma 3. The foregoing can be summarized as
follows (see also Appendix E).
Proposition 8. Under the burden of hidden loan losses, the profitability of growth depends
negatively on the required equity ratio and on the burden of hidden loan losses, but positively on
the growth opportunities ( 2S ). Growth is unprofitable when the required equity ratio is at the
incentive compatible level, *E . When the required equity ratio is sufficiently small ( *ShortEE < ),
growth is profitable if growth opportunities are good ( 2S  is large). Growth is unprofitable under
any equity requirement, if growth opportunities are remote ( MinSS 22 £ ).
Consequently, the bank can gamble for resurrection by growing rapidly. Nevertheless, more equity
capital must be injected into the bank in order to maintain the required equity ratio. Under the
burden of hidden loan losses, the bank is de facto insolvent and its expected returns will be
relatively modest even with growth. Because of this, the banker is unwilling to inject much equity.
The larger the burden of hidden loan losses, the more unpleasant is growth. If the banker can
establish a novel bank with a clean balance sheet, why would he inject instead the same amount of
equity into an insolvent bank? It is more profitable to trigger the non-monitoring strategy during
period-2 with a clean balance sheet than to continue the non-monitoring strategy with an unclean
balance sheet. Hence, the equity ratio that eliminates the non-monitoring strategy with a clean
balance sheet would most certainly eliminate gambling for resurrection with an unclean balance
sheet.16
Only if the required equity ratio is small enough, the banker may be willing to inject
fresh equity. Growth nevertheless needs to be rapid so that the bank can grow out of its problems.
Thus, good growth opportunities are essential.
Recall that the banker’s earnings during period-2 will be zero if the bank retains its
original size, 1. Suppose *ShortEE < ; if the maximal achievable size 2S is large enough, growth is
profitable. Alternatively, the banker can increase his earnings by )1()1( 2 rES +-  through
shrinkage. Hence, both alternatives - growth or shrinkage - are at the same time more profitable
than retaining the initial bank size.
Banking literature greatly emphasizes the incentives to gamble for resurrection and
grow rapidly (Kane, 1989; De Juan, 1996). In his thorough study of the S&L crisis in 1980s, Kane
(1989, p.3) sheds light on the gambling incentives as follows.
Since about 1984, between 600 and 800 thrift institutions have been hopelessly insolvent…
                          the net value of these crippled firms’ assets has sunk so far under water that their managers’
                          only hope of becoming profitable again has been to expand their firms’ funding base and to
invest new funds they rise in the speculative manner. The idea is to “grow out of their
problems” by undertaking longshot new lending and funding activities that essentially
renew and expand (or “double up”) the lost bets of the past.
16 The assumption that a bank is insolvent without growth is not critical. Even if the burden of loan losses is so small
that the bank may be solvent after period-2 without growth, equity ratio *ShortE  eliminates growth.
Kane lists several examples on rapid growth. According to his findings, the value of the insolvent
bank’s stock jumps in the months immediately after an insolvent bank embarks on the high risk
strategy to grow out of its insolvency.17
The cited evidence seems to be more optimistic towards rapid growth and gambling
for resurrection than the model. Yet, a more careful study discloses that the contradiction is
imaginary. Before the S&L crisis, the equity capital requirements were lowered (Kane, 1989, p.54;
White, 1991, p.82-83). Furthermore, the amount of bank equity was overstated, because the equity
requirements were based on historical book values rather than market values. Most of all, the equity
requirements involved five-year averages of net worth and of liabilities and, for de novo
institutions, a twenty-year phase-in period before the thrift had to comply fully with the
requirement. “Thus, for a thrift that grew rapidly in short bursts, and especially for a growing de
novo thrift, the actual equity capital needed at the margin to support that growth was only a fraction
of the nominal net worth requirement (White, 1991, p. 83).”
It appears that the reduction of the equity requirement together with the accounting
loopholes, sharply cut the costs of growth, thereby encouraging banks to gamble for resurrection
through aggressive growth. This explanation is convenient with Proposition 8.
Consequently, bank’s rapid growth as such is not a problem. Rapid growth is likely to
cause problems only if the regulator does not force rapidly growing banks to maintain the normal
equity requirement. When it is maintained, gambling for resurrection can be eliminated.
17 Fleming et al. (1996) report an impressive example on loan rollovers and gambling for resurrection. In Lithuania, an
insolvent bank, which was refinancing its defaulted borrowers by rolling over their loans, expanded its assets from $16
million in 1993 to the $77 in 1994 and $169 in 1995. For banking under a burden of hidden loan losses, see also
Niinimäki (2001).
5.3 Growth with climbing interest on deposits
Although the previous subsection offered few interesting results on gambling for resurrection, the
analysis had shortcomings. The maximal achievable size was fixed. Further, deposit rate did not
react to growth. In addition, some of the results were surprising. Proposition 8 informed that the
banks with the largest burdens of hidden loan losses are the most unwilling to grow. When banks
operate under fixed growth opportunities, 2S , and possess different volumes of hidden loan losses,
it is possible that only the banks with slightest volumes of hidden loan losses will grow. The
intuition is, of course, obvious. Growth calls for the injection of fresh equity. The larger the burden
of loan losses, the more unwilling the banker is to inject fresh equity. This result, however,
contradicts the standard arguments that the most insolvent banks are extremely willing to grow out
of their problems, e.g. Kane (1989). The purpose of this subsection is to show that the model can be
modified in such a way that the most insolvent banks favour growth the most.
 Bank size has no fixed upper limit, but the size is implicitly limited by deposit
interest rate, which climbs as the bank grows and attracts more and more deposits. The term )( 2
rSX
marks the extra costs of deposits a bank must pay over r when its size exceeds a bank-specific size
rS2 ( here =)( 2
rSX 0)(' 2 =
rSX , 0)(' 2 >SX  and 0)('' 2 >SX  when
rSS 22 > , ¥=¥)(X ). Up to
rS2 , it is thus enough to pay interest r on deposits.
rS2 is assumed to be so large and the required
equity ratio so small, under *ShortE , that each bank optimally grows. Given the assumptions, the
banks’ growth policy is studied.
Under symmetric information, banks monitor. Each bank chooses (at most) its
maximal bank-specific size, rS2 , and pays interest r  on deposits. If a bank size exceeded
rS2 , the
loan interest, R , would not cover the cost of lending and the bank would make losses.
Under asymmetric information, each rS 2 is unknown to the regulator, who thus cannot
impose bank-specific maximum sizes. Suppose that a bank neglected monitoring during period-1,
hid its loan losses and keeps on operating during period-2. As regards to its size during period-2,
Appendix G provides the following result.
Proposition 9. A non-monitoring bank chooses for period-2 a size which is socially too large (over
rS2 ). When the equity requirement is sufficiently low, the chosen size grows with the share of
inherited non-performing loans, 1ˆl  .
Two motives drive a bank to grow. First, a non-monitoring bank avoids the costs of monitoring and
thus each successful loan has a positive interest rate spread, crR +> . A monitoring bank has no
such a spread, mcrR ++= .  Since lending is more profitable for a non-monitoring bank, it will
choose a larger size – and pay more for deposits - than a monitoring bank. The size is socially too
large even if the bank possesses no hidden loan losses, 01ˆ =l . Second, the heavier the burden of
hidden loan losses, the lower the expected bank returns are during period-2. As a result, the heavier
the burden of hidden loan losses, the more the bank is ready to pay for deposits in order to grow out
of its problems. If the gamble for resurrection succeeds, the bank makes good returns. If
unsuccessful, the bank collapses and the regulator suffers the costs of the gamble, most of all the
high payments to depositors. Consequently, the most insolvent banks favour growth the most.
Although the regulator cannot use bank size as a tool of control, she can control
growth indirectly by supervising interest rates (a monitoring bank pays interest r on deposits)
Corollary 2. High deposit rate reveals a gamble for resurrection to the regulator.
Unfortunately, the model is too simple to investigate lending at the aggregate level.  However, it is
possible that hidden loan losses may generate lending booms. In the model above, the demand of
loans is extensive: a failed firm will accept a bank’s suggestion to roll over its loan in order to keep
operating and receive a private benefit, b . The firm accepts any loan rate during period-2 since it
will never repay the loan. The supply of loans is also generous, because banks must roll over the
non-performing loans. Furthermore, the banks gamble for resurrection by growing rapidly and
paying high interest on deposits. When the hidden loan losses finally surface, the bubble bursts:
most of the financed projects proved to be worthless, banks are insolvent and the value of deposits
slumps. The regulator then indemnifies deposits. This kind of boom-bust cycle may arise even
without irrational, over-optimistic investment manias (compare Kindleberger, 2000).18
18 For more exhaustive research on financial fragility and competition for deposits see Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000),
Hellman & Murdock & Stiglitz (2000) and Niinimäki (2004).
8. Conclusion
According to the standard banking theory, the problem of moral hazard arises between a bank and
its depositors - or a deposit insurance agent - if the bank can seek a correlated risk for its loans (e.g.
Holmström & Tirole, 1997). Instead, if loan risks are perfectly diversified, a fixed share of the loans
always succeeds and the bank cannot increase its profits by taking excessive risks. Then,
diversification eliminates moral hazard (Diamond, 1984). To reintroduce moral hazard, this paper
has pointed out that moral hazard may arise even when loan risks are diversified if the bank can
hide its loan losses by rolling over these loans. The result expands the magnitude of moral hazard
and may help to understand recent banking crises.
The paper has also studied how the time frame of the lending relationships affects on
the magnitude of moral hazard. Is the moral hazard more severe under short-term or long term
lending? The model indicates that when the regulator’s auditing system is weak, moral hazard is
more severe under long-term lending, since the bank can then hide its loan losses by extending the
maturity of problem loans.  The converse occurs,  when the auditing system is strong. In that case,
moral hazard is remote under long-term lending. First, banks cannot now hide their loan losses.
Furthermore, when the regulator uncovers loan losses, she liquidates a bank. Since ongoing long-
term loans have a minimal liquidation value, the bank liquidation yields nothing to the banker. This
makes the moral hazard behaviour unprofitable.
As to the regulatory recommendations, the model has stressed the importance of the
bank supervision/auditing. In a long run, the quality of the bank supervision ought to be
strengthened so that banks cannot hide their true financial condition. Simultaneously, the
monitoring costs of banks should be reduced so that banks are more motivated to monitor their
borrowers. Unfortunately, these improvements take time. In the short run, the regulator optimally
raises the equity requirement over the normal ratio, if the quality of the bank supervision is weak,
bank transparency is poor or the costs of monitoring borrowers are high for banks. The composition
of equity capital must be designed with extreme care so that the amount of equity provides a
truthful signal of bank solvency. Interest receivables, for instance, should be omitted form equity
capital. Enforced diversification may help to eliminate moral hazard even when banks can hide loan
losses. A bank’s attempt to shrink its lending and pay out equity capital should alert the regulator;
the bank may be insolvent and it may attempt to pay out as much dividends as possible prior to the
surfacing of insolvency. Gambling for resurrection through rapid growth can be eliminated simply
by forcing rapidly growing banks to maintain the normal equity ratio. If the regulator cannot be sure
whether  or  not  the  equity  ratio  is  sufficient,  aggressive  growth,  together  with  high  deposit  rates,
provides a noteworthy warning that the equity requirement is too small, the bank is insolvent and
gambling for resurrection.
Unfortunately, to keep the model simple, several restrictive assumptions had to be
made. Most of all, under bank monitoring projects always succeed and a bank is totally risk-free. A
bank possesses non-performing loans only if it has committed to moral hazard. This makes the
regulator’s policy to close every bank with non-performing loans easy and denies the important role
of bank bailouts (see Aghion et al.,1999; Mitchell, 2000, 2001; Cordella & Yeati, 2003).
This paper has studied banking when a bank can hide its loan losses by rolling over its
problem loans. A logical extension would be to study other forms of hiding. Most of all, a bank can
delay the surface of loan losses by granting fresh loans to its problem borrowers so that they can
repay their original loans. Would this aspect provide different results?
Appendix A
Appendix A proves Proposition 1. Step 1 shows that the bank neglects monitoring when 0=E .
Now, Shortl  meets =+- )1)(1( Rl Short cr ++1  or 0)1( >+= Rml Short . When the realized share
of loan losses is lower than Shortl , with probability 0)( >ShortlF  (recall Assumption 2i), the banker’s
earnings are positive. Thus, it is optimal to neglect monitoring. Step 2 shows that the earnings are
negative when the amount of equity is big enough. Let E  mark the smallest amount of equity that
meets cErRL +-+=+- )1)(1()1)(1( . When EE ³ , the banker’s earnings
ErdllfcrERl
L
L
)1()()1)(1()1)(1( +--+--+-ò ,                      (A.1)
can be expressed as
)1()()1)(1( crdllfRl
L
L
++-+-ò ,                      (A.2)
which is negative (recall (2.6)). Step 3 points out how the earnings are decreasing in equity when
EE < . From (3.1) or
)1()()1()1()1)(1( rEdllfcrERl
Shortl
L
+--+--+-= òp ,                                             (A.3)
it is easy to see =dEdp [ ] 0)1(1)( <+- rlF Short , since 1)( <ShortlF . In sum, the earnings are
positive when 0=E , negative when EE ³   and decreasing in E  when EE <<0 . There exist
*
ShortE , EEShort <<
*0 , such that the earnings are zero. QED
Appendix B
Appendix B proves Proposition 3 using (5.5) and three steps. Step 1 indicates that the bank neglects
monitoring when 0=E . In that case, the banker’s expected earnings are
111 )()1(
1
dllfcrRlh
l
L
---ò ,                      (B.1)
where 0)1( 1 =--- crRl . Since Ll >1  (Assumption 2), there exists a positive probability )( 1lF
that the bank makes a profit. Hence, (B.1) is positive. Since the bank incurs no costs, the banker’s
earnings are positive without monitoring. Step 2 points out that the earnings are negative without
monitoring when 1=E . The banker earns )1(P  that satisfies
<+---ò )1()()1(
1
111 rdllfcRlh
l
L
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Step 3 indicates that the banker’s earnings are decreasing in equity
0)1()()(
1
11 <+-=
P
ò rdllfrhEd
Ed l
L
 .                                                                                      (B.3)
In sum, the earnings are positive when 0=E , negative when 1=E  and decreasing in E , when
10 << E .  There exists an incentive compatible amount of equity, 10 * << LongE , that eliminates the
non-monitoring strategy. QED
Appendix C
Appendix C proves Proposition 4: the weaker the auditing system, the bigger the incentive
compatible amount of equity. Appendix B showed that 0* <P LongEdd  (recall (B.3)). Now (5.5)
implies .0)()( *1
* >=P Long
h
Long EhdEd p Putting 0)(
* >P hdEd Long  and 0
* <P LongEdd  together
provides and a total differential
0*
*
>
P-
P
=
Long
Long
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hdd
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Ed
 .                      (C.1)
QED.
Appendix D
Appendix D proves proposition 5: the heavier the costs of monitoring, the larger the incentive
compatible amount of equity. Recalling mcrR ++=  and using (5.5), it is easy to get
=
P
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Ed Long )(
*
0)()1(
1
111 >-ò
l
L
dllflh .                                                                (D.1)
Putting 0)( * >P mdEd Long  and 0)(
* <P dEEd Long  (recall (B.3)) together gives a total differential
.0*
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P-
P
=
Long
Long Edd
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QED
Appendix E
The bank returns during period-2 (recall (7.3)) can be rewritten as
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The term in the brackets is positive,
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because the contents of both parenthesis are positive. Since the second term of (E.1) is negative and
since the returns from growth are non-negative in total, the first term of (E.1) must be positive even
on the upper limit, 2l ,
.0)1)(1()1)(1( 2222 >--+---+ hccSrESlRS                     (E.3)
QED.
Appendix F
This appendix proves Lemma 3: when *ShortEE = growth is not optimal, but when
*
ShortEE <  growth
is optimal if it is rapid enough. The banker’s earnings during period-2, (7.3), can be rewritten as
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If the term in parenthesis is denoted by ErSEl )1();,ˆ( 212 +-p , (F.1) implies
[ ] hccErErSElS ---+-+-->P )1)(1()1();,ˆ()1( 21222 p ,                      (F.2)
since the lower line of (F.1) exceeds hccEr ---+- )1)(1( . In (F.2), 12 -S  is positive and rising in
2S . Further, 02 >P  and approaches to infinity when 2S  grows without bound if the term in the
brackets is positive. Next, the term is shown to be positive when *ShortEE <  and 2S  is large enough.
To begin with, it is useful to denote bank returns as
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From Appendix A it is known that without the burden of hidden loan losses, equity requirement
*
ShortE  eliminates risk taking: that is,
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Given Appendix A, when *ShortEE < there is 0>e  so that the banker’s earnings exceed e
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 With every 0>e , there exist 0>t  so that
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Since );,ˆ( 212 SEll  is moving upward in 2S  (Lemma 1) and approaches );,0( 22 SEl  when 2S  grows
without bound (Lemma 2), there exist an infinite 2S  so that >);,ˆ( 212 SEll t-);,0( 22 SEl . Then,
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which means that 0)1();,ˆ( 212 >+- ErSElp . Then, the term in brackets of (F.2) is positive. Hence,
02 >P ; the banker’s earnings from growth are positive when
*
ShortEE <  and growth is rapid
enough. Furthermore, the earnings approach to infinity when 2S  grows without bound.
Regarding *ShortEE = , see (F.1). The lower line is non-positive (recall (5.4)). When
*
ShortEE =  the upper line is negative since );,ˆ( 212 SEll );,0( 22 SEl< . Hence, the banker’s earnings
from growth are negative when *ShortEE = .  From (F.1) it is easy to solve
[ ] )8.(.0)1/()1()1)(1()1(ˆ 2
1
2
2
FRrRRlR
ld
d l
L
<++-+-+-=
P
ò
Since the term in brackets is positive (Appendix E), the earnings from growth are decreasing in the
volume of hidden loan losses from period-1. QED.
Appendix G
Step 1: The banker’s earnings from growth are assumed to be positive
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On the upper limit, 2l , bank returns are zero
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Inserting (G.2) into (G.1) indicates
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The term in parenthesis is positive. Step 2: From (G.1), it is easy to solve the optimal bank size
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Since the L.H.S of (G.4) is positive when *ShortEE < and
rSS 22 =  (recall 0)(' 2 =
rSX ), the size is too
large. That is, the size exceeds rS2  with every 1ˆl  and 0)('
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where )(')1)(1()1)(1( *22 SXcErlR ---+--+=F . The nominator is negative due to the
second-order constraint of (G.4) (a more detailed proof is possible, but omitted for brevity). The
objective is to show that the case 01ˆ
*
2 >ldSd is possible. Thus, the denominator must be negative.
Since 0ˆˆ 12 <ldld  (Lemma 1) , F  has to be negative or >)('
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and this is then inserted into (G.3),
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Hence, F  is negative with certainty, when the R.H.S is positive. On the R.H.S the first term is
positive and the second term is negative. The R.H.S is positive if the second term is almost zero.
This is true when E  is small enough. In sum, when E  is small enough, F  is negative and thus
.01ˆ
*
2 >ldSd QED
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